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Executive Summary
The Dispute Settlement Mechanism [DSM] of the 
World Trade Organization [WTO) is often seen as 
one of the major achievements of the multilateral 
trading system. Many believe that the WTO DSM 
has introduced greater "legalism" and provides a 
more "rules-oriented" system relative to the 
"power-oriented" one of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade [GATT). Indeed, since its 
inception in 1995, more and more developing coun­
tries have used this system to pursue their trading 
rights. More important, trade disputes recently 
resolved through the WTO DSM have involved 
successful challenges, by developing countries, to 
certain unfair trade practices of developed coun­
tries, including the Brazilian challenge to U.S. 
cotton subsidies.
Cotton production and trade are highly distorted 
by policy. Since the late 1990s cotton subsidies in 
the United States have been frequently criticized 
for driving down world prices. The continued 
depression of the world cotton price has made this 
commodity a hot spot of agricultural trade disputes 
at the WTO. Citing injury to its domestic cotton 
industry, Brazil initiated a dispute settlement 
accusing the United States of provoking and main­
taining WTO-inconsistent domestic and trade poli­
cies. Relative to the size of national economies, 
some African countries have suffered far more, but 
their voice was rarely heard at the WTO DSM.
The reluctance of poorer nations to use the WTO 
DSM to challenge their richer trading partners 
raises a number of interesting issues. Most funda­
mentally, it reflects a long-recognized fact that 
economic and political power still plays an impor­
tant role in today's world trading system. Because 
of developing countries' lack of financial, institu­
tional, and human resources, they may find the 
barriers to using the WTO DSM prohibitively high. 
For those who manage to enter the DSM or even 
legally win a case, benefits remain elusive because 
they can hardly force the losing defendants into 
compliance. In addition, developing countries risk 
retaliatory action by rich countries whose trade 
policies are challenged. This risk is particularly great 
for the African countries, which are highly depend­
ent on foreign aid from developed countries.
Several policy options are offered to address these 
issues. One way of increasing developing-country
access to the DSM is to reduce litigation costs, 
either by using the legal aid currently offered 
through the Advisory Centre on WTO Law 
(ACWL) or by introducing some tailor-made and 
less-demanding litigation procedures for "small 
claims." A mechanism for collecting trade data and 
the formation of a permanent panel could further 
reduce dispute settlement costs. During the panel 
ruling implementation stage, developing countries 
can build on their retaliatory power by further 
liberalizing their domestic markets and increasing 
the export stake of developed countries. Forging 
alliances with constituencies within the developed 
countries provides an effective strategy that not 
only strengthens developing countries' retaliatory 
power, but also helps them avoid possible political 
repercussions from the losing party.
Your assignment is to propose changes in the 
WTO DSM that would benefit small, low-income 
developing countries.
Background
The Dispute Settlement Mechanism in the 
WTO
The inception of the WTO in 1995 was accom­
panied by a collection of procedural changes to the 
GATT. One aspect that has received a great deal of 
attention is the newly designed DSM. This unique 
mechanism for the settlement of disputes estab­
lishes a formal and mandatory set of procedures 
intended to prevent the detrimental effects of 
unresolved international trade conflicts. More 
important, it helps to mitigate the imbalances 
between stronger and weaker players by making 
the resolution of disputes a matter of law rather 
than power. Most people consider the DSM to be 
one of the major achievements of the Uruguay 
Round, and since 1995 it has gained practical 
importance as members have frequently resorted to 
using this mechanism.
The WTO's DSM is governed by the Dispute 
Settlement Understanding [DSU), which is effec­
tively an interpretation and elaboration of GATT 
Article XXIII. There are four phases in the DSM: 
the consultations, the panel, the appellate review, 
and the implementation. The DSM starts with
consultations, in which a complainant country com­
municates with a defendant country on the latter's 
disputable trade measure[s]. The two parties have 
60 days to consult for a mutually satisfactory solu­
tion to the dispute. If no solutions are worked out, 
the complainant can request a panel proceeding.1
The dispute settlement panel meets with concerned 
parties and other countries [third parties] that 
notify the WTO of a "substantial" interest in the 
case. It then prepares an interim report, offering 
both sides an opportunity to make comments and 
clarification. The two parties can negotiate a settle­
ment at this point. If no settlement is made, the 
panel issues its final report [ruling], which is then 
adopted by the DSB. The complainant, the defend­
ant, or both can appeal; and when this occurs, the 
dispute settlement case moves to the Appellate 
Body [AB].2 The AB upholds or overturns the 
panel ruling in whole or in part and the AB's deci­
sion is final.
If AB ruling favors the defendant, the case typically 
ends; otherwise, the dispute settlement proceeds to 
the implementation stage.3 During this stage, the 
panel or the AB, calls for the defendant to bring its 
measures into accordance with its WTO obliga­
tions. if the complainant believes that the defendant 
has not taken appropriate steps, it can subsequently 
request a "compliance" panel. This panel must 
determine whether the defendant's efforts have, in 
fact, brought its measure(s] into compliance. If not, 
the complainant can ask the DSB for permission to 
"retaliate" against the defendant. Retaliation typi­
cally involves suspending concessions or other 
WTO obligations to the defendant.
How Developing Countries Have Fared in 
the DSM
During the first five years of DSM operation [1995— 
1999], the European Union [EU] and the United 
States made extensive use of the mechanism. Of the 
185 consultation requests made from 1995 through 
1999, the United States and the EU accounted for
1 Panels are established by the Dispute Settlement Body 
[DSB] and are usually composed o f three [possibly five] 
experts from different countries, agreed to by the parties 
on a case-by-case basis.
2 Unlike panels, the AB is a standing body o f jurists that 
is designed to ensure greater consistency across rulings.
3 The implementation stage can also follow the panel 
stage if there is no appeal.
60 and 47, respectively, or a combined 59 percent 
of all requests [Davey 2005], Despite their greater 
representation in the WTO membership, develop­
ing countries only initiated 46 requests [about 25 
percent] during this period.
Between 2000 and 2004, the DSM was marked by 
a noticeable decline in consultation requests—a 
total of 139 requests. More significantly, the EU 
and the United States were no longer the dominant 
complainants in the system. During this period the 
EU and the United States files only 40 consultation 
requests, accounting for less than 30 percent of all 
requests. In contrast, developing countries' use of 
the system increased dramatically during this 
period. Altogether, they initiated around 60 per­
cent of consultation requests. Brazil, Argentina, and 
India were particularly active, initiating 9, 7 and 6 
consultation requests, respectively. Thus, in the 
past few years developing countries have become 
more frequent users of WTO dispute settlement, 
both in absolute and in relative terms.
More important, trade disputes recently resolved 
through the DSM have involved successful chal­
lenges, by developing countries, to certain basic 
policies of the developed countries—for example, 
India's challenge to the EU's Generalized System of 
Preferences [GSP] scheme [DS246], a multiparty 
challenge led by Brazil to the EU sugar program 
[DS265], and Brazil's challenge to U.S. cotton subsi­
dies [DS267], These cases, and a few others, have 
directly or indirectly influenced the ongoing Doha 
Development Agenda negotiations and concluded 
in a direction toward fairer trade between the 
North and the South.
The importance of this development, however, 
should not be overemphasized because it has long 
been argued that the WTO DSM is too compli­
cated for developing countries to make effective 
use of it. Apart from the countries mentioned, 
most developing countries and all least-developed 
countries have remained silent since the creation of 
the WTO DSM. For those that have participated 
and won legal victories through the DSM, it 
remains to be seen whether they will actually 
benefit from those favorable rulings.
The World Cotton Problem
Average cotton stocks in the world have been 
higher since the late 1990s than in earlier periods
Figure 1: W orld C otton  Stocks and Prices, 1973/74—2 0 0 4 /0 5
Cotlook A  Index World Cotton Stocks
(U.S. cents/lb .) (millions o f tons)
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
World Cotton Stocks (millions of tons) -----Cotlook A  Index (U.S. cents/lb.)
Source: UNCTAD 2006.
(Figure l].4 The rise in cotton stocks is attributable 
to excess supply, notably in China and the United 
States, where government incentives have stimu­
lated production. Oversupply of cotton has caused 
a downward pressure on prices.5 Cotlook A index, 
a frequently cited cotton reference price, declined 
consistently during this period, bottoming at 46 
U.S. cents/lb. in 2002, compared with a peak of 97 
cents/lb. in 1995.6 Following a meager upward 
movement in 2003 (63 cents/lb.) due primarily to
4 This discussion o f the world cotton problem focuses 
on the period 1999—2 0 0 2  (and 2001—2 0 0 2  in particular], 
the benchmark period at issue in the Brazil—U.S. cotton  
dispute.
5 The reasons for the collapse o f cotton prices also 
include weak cotton demand as a result o f  slow world 
economic growth and competition from low-priced 
synthetic fibers.
6 The Cotlook A  index is the average o f the cheapest five 
quotations from a selection o f the main upland cottons 
traded internationally. Taking the average o f the five 
cheapest quotations is a means o f identifying those 
growths that are the most competitive and that therefore 
are likely to  be traded in most volume. This practice is a 
proxy for weighting, which is impractical, owing to  the 
absence o f  timely data by which it could be calculated 
(Cotlook 2006).
a temporary increase in world imports, the Cotlook 
A index dropped again in 2004 and 2005 (61 
cents/lb. and 55 cents/lb., respectively).
In 2001/2002, in the midst of an unprecedented 
sharp price slump, U.S. cotton farmers produced a 
record crop of 20.3 million metric tons, 
representing an increase of 42 percent by volume 
or 6 percent by acreage over the 1998 levels. By 
economic theory, such trends would suggest that 
the United States is a more efficient producer of 
cotton than other countries because when prices 
fall, only those with much lower costs would be 
able to expand production.
The United States is not even close to being a low- 
cost producer of cotton, however. A survey of the 
costs of producing raw cotton in 2001 by the 
International Cotton Advisory Committee (ICAC) 
shows that production costs in Benin averaged 
about 30 cents/lb. (and were similar for other 
countries in the region, such as Burkina Faso and 
Mali), whereas one pound of cotton produced in 
the United States cost almost 70 cents (ICAC 
2001). Despite its relatively high cost of 
production, the United States was still able to 
expand its area under cotton cultivation and
increase its world market share, whereas several 
highly efficient producers in Africa and elsewhere 
were forced to cut production or move completely 
out of the market.
The competitiveness of U.S. cotton on the world 
market was backed up by subsidies and the United 
States accounts for approximately one-half of the 
world's total production subsidies for cotton 
[Watkins 2002], In 2001 the value of outlays in the 
form of cotton subsidies by the U.S Department of 
Agriculture's Commodity Credit Corporation 
[CCC] exceeded US$4 billion, higher than the value 
of total U.S. cotton production, which amounted 
to US$3 billion at world market prices in the same
year [WTO 2002], Figure 2 breaks down the unit 
value of a pound of cotton produced and marketed 
in the United States in 2001/2002. Under the new 
marketing arrangements set in the 2002 Farm Act, 
cotton farmers were guaranteed a price of around 
52 cents per pound ["loan rate"]. In addition, 
farmers received a further set of payments [for 
example, "direct payments" and "counter-cyclical 
payments"] to top up their income. The result is 
that, regardless of what happened to world market 
prices, farmers received a price of 72 cents per 
pound. This price was about 57 percent above the 
world market price in 2001/2002 [46 cents per 
pound].
Figure 2: Value Com position o f  One Pound o f  U.S. C otton
80
70
60
50
§  40  
(Ad
30
20
10
0
One pound of cotton
U.S. target price: 72
Mininum U.S. price to farmers [loan rate]: 52 
World market price: 46
Source: Watkins 2002.
U.S. subsidies to cotton farmers are important for 
the world market because a large share of the 
domestic production is exported.7 Since 2001, U.S. 
exports as a share of production have averaged 59 
percent, up from an average of 42 percent during 
the early 1990s. Today, the United States is the 
world's largest cotton exporter, accounting for 
more than 40 percent of world cotton trade in 
recent years. Large U.S. exports depress the world 
prices and impoverish farmers in developing coun­
tries who are competing against U.S. in interna­
tional and domestic markets.
Brazil-U.S. Dispute Settlement on Cotton 
Subsidies
In late 2002 Brazil initiated a WTO dispute settle­
ment case [DS267] against specific provisions of the 
U.S. cotton program. On September 8, 2004, a 
WTO dispute settlement [DS] panel ruled against 
the United States on several key issues. On 
October 18, 2004, the United States appealed the 
case to the WTO's AB, which, on March 3, 2005, 
confirmed the earlier DS panel findings against U.S. 
cotton programs. Key findings from the panel and 
AB reports include the following:
1. The AB upheld the panel's finding that the 
"peace clause" in the WTO's Agreement 
on Agriculture [AA] did not apply to a 
number of U.S. measures, including 
domestic support measures for upland 
cotton.8 In addition, Production Flexibility 
Contract and Direct Payment outlays are 
non-decoupled subsidy payments and need 
to be evaluated against the "peace clause" 
limits.
2. The AB upheld the panel's finding that the 
effect of the subsidy programs at issue— 
that is, marketing loan program payments, 
Step 2 payments, market loss assistance
7 Although cotton subsidies are also large in China, the 
country has been a net importer in most years.
8 The peace clause refers to Article 13 of the AA, which 
exempts domestic support measures from being
challenged as illegal subsidies through DSM as long as the 
level of support for a commodity remains at or below 
the benchmark 1992 marketing year [MY] levels. Cotton 
subsidies in the United States were about US$2.0 billion 
in MY1992 but rose to more than US$4.1 billion in 
MY2001 and more than US$3.1 billion in MY2002 
[WT/DS267/ R]. The peace clause expired at the end of
2003.
payments, and countercyclical payments— 
is significant price suppression within the 
meaning of Article 6.3[c] of the Agree­
ment on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures [ASCM], causing serious preju­
dice to Brazil's interests within the meaning 
of Article 5[c] of the ASCM.9 *
3. The AB upheld the panel's finding that 
Step 2 payments to domestic users of U.S. 
upland cotton were subsidies contingent 
on the use of domestic over imported 
goods and thus are prohibited under 
Articles 3.1[b] and 3.2 of the ASCM. The 
AB also upheld the panel's findings that 
Step 2 payments to exporters of U.S. up­
land cotton constitute subsidies contingent 
upon export performance within the 
meaning of Article 9.1[a] of the AA, and, 
consequently, the United States had acted 
inconsistently with AA Articles 3.3 and 8. 
In addition, the AB found that the Step 2 
payments to exporters were prohibited 
export subsidies that were inconsistent 
with Articles 3.1[a] and 3.2. of the ASCM.
4. The AB upheld the panel's finding that the 
U.S. export credit guarantee programs at 
issue were "export subsidies" within the 
terms of the ASCM and thus circum­
vented the U.S. export subsidy commit­
ments in violation of Article 10.1 of the 
AA and Articles 3.1[a] and 3.2 of the 
ASCM.
5. The panel recommended that [i] the 
United States should withdraw prohibited 
subsidies [export credit guarantees and 
Step 2 payments] without delay [in this 
case, within six months of the date of 
adoption of the panel/AB report or July 1, 
2005, whichever was earlier]; and [ii] the 
United States should take appropriate 
steps to remove the adverse effects of 
subsidies found to cause serious prejudice 
or withdraw them.
9 The panel found that other U.S. domestic support 
programs [that is, production flexibility contract 
payments, direct payments, and crop insurance 
payments] did not cause serious prejudice to Brazil's 
interests because Brazil failed to prove a necessary causal 
link between these programs and significant price 
suppression.
On March 21, 2005, the WTO adopted the AB and 
panel reports [WT/DS267/R, WT/DS267/AB/R), 
initiating a sequence of events under the WTO 
DSM whereby the United States is required to 
bring its policies into line with the panel's recom­
mendations or negotiate a mutually acceptable set­
tlement with Brazil [see WTO 2007 for an up-to- 
date account of dispute settlement]. In response, 
the U.S. government took several steps to bring 
the relevant programs into compliance. For exam­
ple, the U.S. Department of Agriculture [USDA] 
modified the operation of the export credit 
program by issuing new regulations, basing fees 
that exporters must pay on the risk of non-repay- 
ment of loans made under the program. The Step 2 
cotton program was terminated on August I, 
2006, after the completion of the 2005 marketing 
year.
Stakeholders
The United States
Cotton is an important agricultural commodity in 
the United States. During 1999-2002, U.S. cash 
receipts from cotton production averaged US$4.6 
billion per year, while export sales averaged more 
than US$2.1 billion. Cotton is grown in various U.S. 
states. In 2002, 17 states reported cotton produc­
tion valued at more than US$10 million. Texas is 
the largest cotton-producing state, accounting for 
an average of 26 percent of total U.S. production 
since 1993 (Schnepf 2005],
Cotton is one of the principal U.S. program crops, 
along with wheat, rice, feed grains, soybeans, and 
peanuts. Qualifying U.S. cotton producers are eli­
gible for various program benefits including direct 
payments, countercyclical payments, loan deficiency 
payments, and the recently repealed Step 2 pay­
ments. From fiscal year 1991 [FY1991] to FY2004, 
U.S. farm subsidies for cotton production averaged 
US$1.7 billion per year, peaking in FY2000 at 
US$3.8 billion [Schnepf 2005].10 U.S. subsidy levels, 
coupled with U.S. prominence in global markets, 
have contributed to the sharp decrease in the 
world cotton price in recent years, resulting in
10 The USDA reports commodity program outlays on a 
fiscal year basis. The marketing year data used in the 
WTO case is converted from the fiscal year data. In the 
United States, the cotton marketing year starts August 1 
and ends July 31 of the following year.
much international attention to U.S. cotton 
program outlays.
The WTO AB ruling on U.S. cotton subsidies has 
several implications for its domestic cotton policies. 
First, the United States must stop all "prohibited" 
export subsidies [that is, Step 2 payments and the 
subsidy element of export credit guarantees under 
the Export Credit Guarantee Program [GSM-102], 
the Intermediate Export Credit Guarantee Program 
[GSM-103], and the Supplier Credit Guarantee Pro­
gram [SCGP]]. Second, with regard to a ruling on 
"actionable" subsidies under the finding of serious 
prejudice caused by "price-contingent" subsidies 
[such as loan deficiency payments, marketing loss 
assistance payments, countercyclical payments, and 
Step 2 payments], the United States needs to "take 
appropriate steps to remove the adverse effects or 
withdraw the subsidy." Third, the United States 
must reform or eliminate its direct payment 
schemes so that they are truly decoupled from 
production decisions.1 *
The ruling from the Brazil-U.S. dispute settlement 
also demands deep reform of current U.S. farm 
policies in general. Most of the panel findings could 
extend beyond cotton to other major field crops 
[depending on their subsidy rate and shares in 
markets], particularly those concerning the poten­
tial limits on export credit guarantees. Some trade 
and market analysts, as well as legislators, have 
expressed concern that a broad finding against 
provisions of the U.S. cotton program could neces­
sitate legislative changes to bring existing program 
operations into compliance with WTO rules, which 
could in turn necessitate changes in the next farm 
bill [Mercier and Smith 2006],
Cotton-Dependent Developing Countries
Cotton is widely grown in the developing world. 
Production and sales of cotton provides a vital 
source of national income and foreign exchange
1 it is noteworthy that the panel finding that U.S. direct
payments do not qualify for WTO exemptions from 
reduction commitments as fully decoupled income 
support [that is, they are not green box-compliant] 
appears to have no further consequences within the 
context of this case and does not involve any compliance 
measures. This is because direct payments were deemed 
"non-price contingent" and thus were evaluated strictly 
in terms of the peace clause violation, not as actionable 
subsidies.
earnings for some of the world's poorest countries. 
For example, cotton accounts for approximately 40 
percent of export earnings in Benin and Burkina 
Faso and 30 percent in Chad, Mali, and Uzbekistan. 
Its contribution to gross domestic product [GDP) 
in these and other developing countries ranges 
from 5 to 10 percent [Baffes 2003). Cotton also 
plays a pivotal role in the livelihoods of poor 
people. It is estimated that around 1 billion people 
in developing countries are directly or indirectly 
involved in cotton production and marketing 
[Watkins 2002). The state of the world's cotton 
economy has a critical bearing on their food 
security and economic well-being.
Since the mid-1990s that state has deteriorated. 
With continuously declining prices, many cotton 
farmers and traders in developing countries were 
driven out of the market. At a historical low price 
of 46 cents per pound in 2001/2002, even the 
most efficient producers would operate at a loss, 
unable to cover the costs of production and 
marketing. Brazil allegedly had suffered substantially 
from the low world price despite the fact that it is 
one of the lowest-cost cotton producers in the 
world. In its request for consultation 
[WT/DS267/1), Brazil showed that the U.S. sub­
sidies induced a 41 percent increase in U.S. cotton 
exports, hence reducing the world price of cotton 
by 12.6 percent. Based on these figures, the losses 
incurred by Brazil were estimated at about US$600 
million for the marketing year 2001 alone [Baffes 
2004).12
The impact of the price depression was even 
greater on the poor cotton-dependent African 
countries, relative to the size of their national 
economies. It was estimated that in 2001 Africa lost 
a total of US$441 million because of trade distor­
tions in cotton markets. Between 2003 and 2004, 
four West and Central African producers [Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali) reportedly suffered a 
total export loss of around US$382 million [Baden 
2004). These losses are more devastating for the 
poor population in the least developed countries 
because the cotton sector usually provides the only 
option for access to cash income and employment. 
In response to the crisis, a "Sectoral Initiative in
12 It is worth noting that during 1999-2002, Brazil's 
cotton production and consumption were approximately 
equal and only in two of the four seasons was Brazil a net 
cotton importer.
Favor of Cotton" was raised in the WTO in 2003 
by Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali. The four 
countries ["cotton-4") described the damage that 
had been caused to them by cotton subsidies in 
richer countries and called for the subsidies to be 
eliminated and for compensation to be made to the 
four economies.
Countries in the Doha Round Agricultural 
Negotiations
The dispute settlement on U.S. cotton subsidies has 
profound political implications far beyond this 
specific case. The cotton ruling, together with a 
subsequent one on sugar [against the EU), estab­
lished that developed countries had failed to abide 
by subsidy rules that they crafted during the 
Uruguay Round.13 This in turn has had serious 
damaging effects on their credibility in the Doha 
Round. Developing countries, on the other hand, 
have had an important moral and legal victory and 
as a result are poised in a stronger position in 
current multilateral negotiations.
The ruling on U.S. cotton subsidies, if fully com­
plied with, could have substantial positive impacts 
on the ongoing agricultural negotiations in the 
current Doha Round. There could be an overall 
strengthening of ambition on further liberalizing 
agriculture trade, because developing countries and 
the Cairns Group could conclude that developed 
countries, such as the United States, are seriously 
interested in reform. Such a development could 
also increase the level of market access that devel­
oped-country producers seek to achieve in the 
Doha Round. In addition, U.S. compliance would 
increase the chances of reducing subsidies in the 
EU. Given that the United States wants to disci­
pline EU subsidies, which are also subject to chal­
lenge at the DSM, implementation of the panel 
ruling would signal to the EU that it should do the 
same.14 It is important to note, however, that the
13 In September 2002 Australia and Brazil initiated a trade 
dispute settlement process against the EU's sugar export 
subsidies [DS26S and DS266; they were later joined by 
Thailand [DS283]). In April 2005 the AB upheld the 
major findings of the panel, which ruled that the EU had 
subsidized sugar exports beyond the level formally 
notified to the WTO and was thus in violation of the 
WTO AA.
14 The reform of the Common Agricultural Policy [CAP) 
and subsequent reforms in sugar, wine, fruit, and
positive effects are contingent on full U.S. 
compliance with the panel ruling. If it chooses not 
to comply, things could work in the opposite 
direction.
Policy Issues
Some researchers argue that with the creation of 
the WTO DSM, developing countries have been 
more able to identify potential violations of WTO 
commitments and have disputes settled in their 
favor. Jackson [1997] and others have noted, for 
example, that the new dispute settlement system 
under the WTO is more "rule-oriented" relative to 
the "power-oriented" system under the GATT. 
Indeed, the dispute settlement in the U.S. cotton 
case, as well as in many others including the recent 
EU sugar case, appears to support such an opti­
mistic view. Notwithstanding progress, there still 
exists a need to enhance the capacity of and incen­
tives for developing countries, especially the least- 
developed countries [LDCs], to use the system to 
ensure their trading rights. More important, sys­
temic issues relating to the implementation of panel 
rulings remain to be addressed in order to safe­
guard the interests of developing countries in a 
more incontestable manner.
The Costs of Dispute Settlement
Developing countries frequently point out that the 
major players in the WTO DSM are usually rich 
and large countries such as Canada, the EU, Japan, 
and the United States (Table I], One reason offered 
in the literature is that these countries have larger 
trade interests relative to small and poor countries, 
and higher trade volumes increase the stake in 
liberalization, which justifies investing resources in 
settling a trade dispute (Horn et al. 2005]. In con­
trast, smaller and poorer economies tend to have 
smaller trade stakes both overall and in individual 
commodities. This fact makes them more sensitive 
to costs in the dispute settlement process, because 
it may be less beneficial for them to press charges 
against countries that maintain illegal trade meas­
ures. From 1995 to 2002, high-income countries 
were involved in more than 60 percent of the 
dispute cases, whereas low-income countries 
accounted for only 7 percent.
vegetable production in the EU have shown some 
progress in this direction.
In the current WTO DSM the costs of settling a 
case turn out to be large. There are two types of 
costs associated with the dispute settlement process 
(see, for example, Hoekman and Mavroidis 2000; 
Bown 2005J. The first type concerns the informa­
tion costs relating to the litigation. This type of 
cost is lower for developed countries because they 
are well equipped with legal talent, are well briefed 
by export interests, and have a worldwide network 
of commercial and diplomatic representation that 
feeds their systems with relevant data. The informa­
tion costs for developing countries, in contrast, are 
higher since they have limited national expertise 
available and find it difficult to collect the type of 
information that is required to bring or defend a 
WTO case.
The second type of cost is directly related to the 
litigation process and consists of the lawyers' and 
diplomats' wages. It is reported that Brazil spent 
between US$1 million and US$2 million on legal 
fees in the cotton case against the United States 
(Shaffer 2005], Although both developing and 
developed countries may face high legal costs if 
they decide to litigate, developing countries may 
find it harder to bear this burden. For example, the 
costs associated with the cotton case may be 
prohibitive for poor African nations, because their 
fiscal deficits are already at dangerously high levels. 
In short, if the sum of the two types of costs 
exceeds the potential gains of legally "winning" a 
case, developing countries may choose not to 
participate in the litigation process, even though 
they have a right to do so and an economic 
interest in the dispute's outcome.
Retaliatory Power of the Complainants
The WTO is a set of self-enforcing agreements. 
From this perspective, the final outcome of a dis­
pute settlement will depend on how effectively the 
winning party can force the losing one into com­
pliance with the panel rulings. The WTO DSU 
stipulates that in case of noncompliance, at the end 
of a reasonable period of time (approximately 15 
months], the plaintiff can set up specific WTO- 
sanctioned retaliatory measures (such as the sus­
pension of concessions and other obligations] 
against the defendant to prevent continued losses, 
to induce change, and to deter unlawful behavior. 
In the WTO DSM, retaliation may play a central 
role as an ultimate safeguard for complainants 
against noncompliance, because reluctant respond­
ents can no longer block the dispute settlement
Table 1: Participation in WTO Dispute Settlem ent b y  M em bers' Level o f  Developm ent, 1995-2002
Incom e C ategory
N o . o f  Cases as 
C om plainant
N o . o f  Cases as 
D efendant
Percentage o f  W T O  
M em bers' Total Exports
Low 20 [7%] 20 [7%] 3.8
Lower-middle 48 [17%] 35 [12%] 12.4
Upper-middle 35 [12%] 46 [16%] 10.2
High 183 [64%] 185 [65%] 73.6
Total 286 [100%] 286 [100%] 100.0
Source: Busch and Reinhardt 2003.
process and avoiding compliance is the only form 
of noncooperation left to them. In the cotton case, 
faced with the U.S. government's failure to elimi­
nate its illegal programs by the deadline of July 1, 
2005, Brazil requested authorization to take retalia­
tory measures during the DSB's meeting on July 15, 
2005 JWT/DS267/21].15
Although the WTO DSU gives any member the 
possibility to use retaliation whenever noncom­
pliance occurs, the credibility of a retaliatory threat 
could be different among different countries. It is 
evident that a retaliatory threat is more credible if 
the actual retaliation can lead to more welfare 
losses to the defendant. In this sense, larger and 
richer countries are more capable of imposing 
credible retaliatory threats against smaller and 
poorer countries, because rich countries usually 
maintain valuable market access commitments to 
poor countries that they can threaten to withdraw 
in retaliation. The more credible the threat is, the 
more likely a complaint will achieve full compliance 
from the defendant. Table 2 shows the outcome of 
dispute settlement by the complainant's develop­
ment level. The numbers clearly show that devel­
oped countries have been more successful in gain­
ing full concessions than less-developed ones.
Smaller countries, in contrast, are less capable of 
making credible threats because their potential 
retaliation will have little impact on the target
15 Recognizing, however, that the U.S. administration had 
made a first step by submitting its reform proposal to 
Congress, Brazil signed a bilateral accord with the United 
States that led to suspension of the arbitration procedure 
in order to give the United States more time to follow 
through with the legislative process for eliminating the 
subsidies [WT/DS267/22],
market but can be costly in domestic welfare terms. 
It is thus not surprising that developing countries 
have rarely turned to retaliation to enforce dispute 
settlement against developed countries. The 
pressure for the latter to comply with panel rulings 
has been weak and largely moral in nature. As a 
result, developing countries have gained full 
concessions in fewer cases; about 40 percent of the 
cases involving poorer countries have concluded 
with full concessions [Table 2J.
The asymmetry in enforcement power offers 
another reason [beyond of costs of litigation] why 
larger and richer countries are more likely to take 
up cases against smaller and poorer countries but 
not vice versa. With a larger economy, Brazil has 
more retaliatory capacity than smaller African 
countries to threaten to impose economic costs on 
the United States should it fail to comply with the 
panel decisions. In fact, Brazil has already 
announced that it plans to suspend some of its ob­
ligations under the Treaty on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights [TRIPS] if 
the United States does not respect its obligations 
[WT/DS267/21J.
Suspension of Aid or Preferential Treatment
Developing countries will always face extra-legal 
pressure from powerful countries, undermining the 
goal of objective trade dispute resolution through 
law. Many times, a small developing country can do 
little to counter EU or U.S. threats to withdraw 
preferential tariff benefits or foreign aid—even 
food aid—if the country challenges a European or 
U.S. trade measure. Such political tactics can 
undermine developing countries' faith in the 
efficacy of the legal system.
Table 2: Dispute Settlem ent O utcom es b y  Complainant's Level o f  Developm ent, 1995-2002
Incom e C ategory
Level o f  C oncessions
N o n e Partial Full Total
Low and lower-middle 8 [29%) 8 [29%) 12 [43%) 28 [100%)
Upper-middle 4 [27%) 3 [20%) 8 [53%) 15 [100%)
High 20 [18%) 10 [9%) 82 [73%) 112 [100%)
Total 32 21 102 155
Note: Table includes disputes concluded by early 2003. Too few disputes with low-income complainants occurred during 
the period for them to be counted separately.
Source: Busch and Reinhardt 2003.
The literature has identified two additional types of 
political-economic issues that could affect coun­
tries' willingness to participate in dispute settlement 
[Bown 2005], First, a complainant that receives 
economic assistance from a respondent would 
exercise self-constraint in the litigation process in 
order not to jeopardize its privilege. Specifically, 
the more reliant the complainant is on the respond­
ent for assistance and the more aid the respondent 
could threaten to withdraw, the less likely that the 
complainant would formally participate in a case 
against the respondent. For example, Sub-Saharan 
Africa as a whole received about US$2 billion for­
eign aid from the United States in 2001 [excluding 
food aid), which far exceeded the estimated losses 
they had suffered from cotton trade in that year 
[about US$400 million). The U.S. foreign aid pro­
grams in the areas of economic and humanitarian 
assistance, such as development assistance, child 
survival and health funds, and HIV/AIDS initiatives, 
are critically important for these countries, which 
face profound public health, poverty, and develop­
ment challenges. To avoid losing the foreign aid, 
none of the African countries joined the cotton 
dispute as co-complainants [although two partici­
pated as third parties).
The second political-economic pressure occurs 
when two countries participate in pre-existent 
preferential trade agreements or a privileged trade 
area. Once again, the threat of jeopardizing the 
economic relationship influences potential litigants' 
behavior in dispute settlement.
Policy Options
Substantial trade liberalization must be achieved if 
countries are to reap the benefits of globalization. 
Multilateral negotiations under the WTO play a 
pivotal role in facilitating global trade. Yet 
throughout the world, pressures for protectionism 
abound, threatening to roll back gains. Developed 
countries continue to succumb to lobbying by 
their own domestic producers and grant them 
protection. Simultaneously, developing countries 
with smaller fiscal resources respond by increasing 
border protection to shield their domestic farmers 
from declining agricultural prices. Domestic and 
WTO policy decisions have resulted in continued 
high subsidies in developed countries, matched by 
high tariffs in developing countries. The WTO's 
DSM may offer an alternative solution to this 
"prisoner's dilemma," by regulating the behaviors 
of different players in the global trading system.16 
A globally efficient and welfare-enhancing outcome 
is achievable if the DSM can effectively reduce sub­
sidies on the one hand and protection on the 
other. The Brazil-U.S. cotton case exemplifies the 
important role that the DSM plays in moving the 
multinational trading system in a pro-development 
direction. But for the vast majority of developing
16 in game theory, the prisoner's dilemma is a type of 
non-zero-sum game in which two players try to get 
rewards by cooperating with or betraying the other 
player, in this game setup, cooperating is a strategy 
strictly dominated by defecting, so that the only possible 
equilibrium for the game is for all players to defect. This 
equilibrium is not, however, Pareto optimal in the sense 
that both can be better off by cooperating—hence the 
dilemma.
countries to effectively use the system to their full 
advantage, some additional steps must be followed 
to improve the DSM.
Lowering the Cost of Information
To lower the cost of information, a developing 
country government should identify an approach 
that can reduce the burden on individual enter­
prises to have expertise on WTO matters and to 
collect, aggregate, and analyze relevant data. One 
policy option toward this end is to create an inde­
pendent agency that specializes in trade barrier data 
collection and analysis [Hoekman and Mavroidis 
2000], Through periodic surveys, data could be 
collected from a representative cross-section of 
trading companies, multinationals, trade and indus­
try associations, and consumer organizations. The 
information that is complied by the agency based 
on the survey data would be used by policy makers 
to assess the status of export markets, identify 
restrictive policies maintained by the trading part­
ner, and establish potential WTO dispute cases.
Adopting Procedural Reform
Because many cases that involve developing coun­
tries pertain to relatively small trade volumes, 
another way of reducing the cost of litigation is to 
consider adopting “light" dispute settlement proce­
dures for "small" cases brought by developing 
countries (Horn et al. 2005). In such cases, fewer 
panelists could be appointed, and the panel process 
could be completed in a shorter period. A short­
ened and simplified panel process reduces lawyer 
fees, which are often assessed based on the com­
plexity and time length of a case. Another possible 
option is to allow "light" procedures to be used in 
cases where affected exports are small in absolute 
terms but large in relative terms for the country or 
countries bringing the case. For developing coun­
tries even a small absolute trade flow may represent 
a large proportion of its total exports. Thus, a 
timely resolution of the case can not only reduce 
litigation costs, but also minimize the damage to 
the export sector for the duration of the dispute 
settlement.
Establishing a Permanent Panel
In the WTO DSM, panels are established by the 
DSB on a case-by-case basis, with panelists being 
current or former government officials paid by
their respective governments. An alternative to the 
current practice is to establish a permanent roster 
of panelists who would be readily available to serve 
in dispute settlement panels and be compensated 
for their time through the WTO budget (Hoekman 
and Mavroidis 2000). This in effect would create a 
standing body of jurists that is similar to the AB. 
Permanent panels could have a number of addi­
tional benefits, including reducing the burden on 
the WTO Secretariat associated with DSM, more 
rapid conclusion of cases, more professionalism, 
and greater consistency in outcomes. Such a meas­
ure would, however, increase the WTO budget and 
would require additional funding from the 
members.
Providing Legal Aid
The creation of the Advisory Center on WTO Law 
(ACWL) further increases the ability of a develop­
ing country to participate in the dispute settlement 
process. The center, created in 2001 by a group of 
developed and developing countries, is designed to 
provide legal assistance on WTO matters to devel­
oping countries for below-market fees.17 Specifically, 
it provides (1) general legal advice, (2) legal assis­
tance in WTO dispute settlement proceedings, and 
(3) training in WTO dispute settlement. The devel­
oped members of the center have contributed the 
equivalent of at least US$1 million to its endow­
ment. Developing countries are required to make a 
one-time contribution that varies depending on 
their share of world trade and per capita income, 
with no contribution required from least-developed 
countries. From 2001 to 2005, the center provided 
direct assistance in about 20 WTO cases. Seven of 
the cases involved developing-country versus 
developing-country matters—in each case on behalf 
of the poorer complaining developing country. The 
other cases involved challenges to developed- 
country measures, with six cases directed against 
the EU, three against the United States, and two 
against Australia. The completed cases have all been 
at least partially successful. Although it is still too 
early to assess the center's long-term impact on the 
position of developing countries in WTO dispute
17 For example, LDCs are charged $25 per hour, while 
developing country members are charged between $100 
and $ 2 0 0  per hour depending on economic size and per 
capita income. Developing countries that are not ACWL 
members may also request the Centre for legal advice, 
on a non-priority rate o f $250 to $350 per hour.
settlement, the experience so far seems to be 
positive.
Reconsidering Retaliation
Considering the weak enforcement power of 
developing countries, a recommendation frequently 
proposed is to change the rules so that non-imple­
mentation of panel rulings would be punished by 
withdrawal of market access commitments by all 
WTO members. In addition, developing countries 
can increase their own retaliatory power by further 
liberalizing their domestic market to developed- 
country exporters, because retaliation threats 
become more credible when the defendant has a 
larger export stake in the complainant's market. 
There is a basic problem, however, with unilateral 
or multilateral retaliation: it usually results in the 
complainant's responding to a WTO-inconsistent 
trade barrier with another trade barrier, an out­
come that is contrary to the liberalization philoso­
phy underlying the WTO. From an economic pers­
pective, raising barriers is detrimental to the inter­
ests of the countries that do so, and to world wel­
fare more generally. Thus, it would be much better 
if the WTO DSM could encourage use of the pro­
visions in the WTO for re-negotiating concessions 
[Hoekman and Mavroidis 2000]. This approach 
would ensure that the net impact of dispute resolu­
tion would be more liberal trade rather than more 
protectionism, as negotiation involves compensat­
ing members affected by the withdrawal of a 
concession by reducing other trade barriers.
Building a North-South Alliance
Another strategy for strengthening a developing- 
country complainant's retaliatory power and 
avoiding possible political and economic reper­
cussions is to forge alliances with constituencies 
within the developed countries [Shaffer 2005], By 
harnessing domestic political pressure and legal 
expertise within developed countries such as the 
EU and the United States, developing countries 
can, to a certain extent, offset the resource imbal­
ances, enhance the credibility of their threats, and 
curtail the extra-legal coercion. Possible partners 
include the northern-based nongovernmental 
organizations [NGOs], consumer groups, and 
exporting industries that have a stake in the 
complainant's market.
Assignment
Your assignment is to propose changes in the
WTO DSM that would benefit small, low-income
developing countries.
Additional Readings
Hoekman, B., and P. Mavroidis. 2000. WTO dis­
pute settlement, transparency, and surveillance. 
World Economy 23 [4]: 527-542.
Schnepf, R. 2005. Background on the US-Brazil 
WTO cotton subsidy dispute. Congressional 
Research Service [CRS] Report for Congress 
No. RL3257I. Washington, DC: CRS.
Watkins, K. 2002. Cultivating poverty: The impact 
o f US cotton subsidies on Africa. Oxfam 
Briefing Paper 30. Oxford, UK: Oxfam.
References
Baden, S. 2004. White gold turns to  dust: Which 
way forward for cotton in West Africa? Oxfam 
Briefing Paper 58. Oxford, UK: Oxfam.
Baffes, J. 2003. Cotton and developing countries: A  
case study in policy incoherence. World Bank 
Trade Note No. 10. Washington, DC: World 
Bank.
---------. 2004. Brazil vs. US: Cotton subsidies and
implications for development World Bank 
Trade Note No. 16. Washington, DC: World 
Bank.
Bown, C. 2005. Participation in WTO dispute set­
tlement: Complainants, interested parties, and 
free riders. World Bank Economic Review 19 
[2]: 287-310.
Busch, M., and E. Reinhardt. 2003. Developing 
countries and General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade/World Trade Organization dispute 
settlement. Journal o f World Trade 37 [4]: 719- 
735.
Cotlook. 2006. The Cotlook indices: An explana­
tion.
http://www.cotlook.com/information/cotlook
indices.php.
Davey, W. 2005. The WTO dispute settlement sys­
tem: How have developing countries fared? 
Illinois Public Law Research Paper No. 05-17. 
Champaign, IL: University of Illinois.
Hoekman, B., and P. Mavroidis. 2000. WTO dis­
pute settlement, transparency and surveillance. 
World Economy 27> [4]: 527-542.
Horn, H., P. Mavroidis, and H. Nordstrom. 2005. 
Is the use of the WTO dispute settlement sys­
tem biased? In P. Mavroidis and A. Sykes, eds., 
The WTO and international trade law/dispute 
settlement. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
ICAC [International Cotton Advisory Committee]. 
2001. Survey o f the cost o f production o f raw 
cotton. Washington, DC.
Jackson, J. 1997. The world trading system: Law and 
policy o f international economic relations 2nd 
ed. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Mercier, S., and V. Smith. 2006. Domestic farm 
policy for 2007: Forces for change. Choices 21 
[4]: 209-214.
Schnepf, R. 2005. Background on the US-Brazil 
WTO cotton subsidy dispute. Congressional 
Research Service [CRS] Report for Congress, 
No. RL32571. Washington, DC: CRS.
Shaffer, G. 2005. The challenges of WTO law: 
Strategies for developing country adaptation." 
Paper presented at the conference "WTO Dis­
pute Settlement and Developing Countries: 
Use, Implication, Strategies and Reforms," Uni­
versity of Wisconsin-Madison, May.
UNCTAD [United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development], 2006. Handbook o f statis­
tics on-line. Geneva.
Watkins, K. 2002. Cultivating poverty: The impact 
o f US cotton subsidies on Africa. Oxfam 
Briefing Paper 30. Oxford, UK: Oxfam.
WTO [World Trade Organization]. 2002. United 
States: Subsidies on upland cotton: Request for 
consultations by Brazil. WT/DS267/1. Geneva.
---------. 2007. Summary of the dispute to date
[DS267],
http://www.wto.org/english/tratoD e/dispu e 
/cases e/ds267 e.htm#summarv [accessed 
March 15,2007],
